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Behavioral Pragmatism:
No Place for Reality and Truth
Dermot Barnes-Holmes
National University of Ireland, Maynooth
The current article begins by reviewing L. J. Hayes's claim that pragmatism relies on a correspon-
dence-based truth criterion. To evaluate her claim, the concept of the observation sentence, proposed
by the pragmatist philosopher W. V. Quine, is examined. The observation sentence appears to
remove the issue of correspondence from Quine's pragmatist philosophy. Nevertheless, the issue of
correspondence reemerges, as the problem of homology, when Quine appeals to agreement between
or among observation sentences as the basis for truth. Quine also argues, however, that the problem
of homology (i.e., correspondence) should be ignored on pragmatic grounds. Because the problem
is simply ignored, but not resolved, there appears to be some substance to Hayes's claim that
pragmatism relies ultimately on correspondence as a truth criterion. Behavioral pragmatism is then
introduced to circumvent both Hayes's claim and Quine's implicit appeal to correspondence. Be-
havioral pragmatism avoids correspondence by appealing to the personal goals (i.e., the behavior)
of the scientist or philosopher as the basis for establishing truth. One consequence of this approach,
however, is that science and philosophy are robbed of any final or absolute objectives and thus may
not be a satisfactory solution to philosophers. On balance, behavioral pragmatism avoids any appeal
to correspondence-based truth, and thus it cannot be criticized for generating the same philosophical
problems that have come to be associated with this truth criterion.
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The idea that scientists are primarily
concerned with understanding the nat-
ural world is taken by most to be axi-
omatic. Not all scholars are entirely
convinced that this is the case, how-
ever. The philosophical tradition
known as pragmatism, for example,
questions the apparently obvious idea
that science is concerned with devel-
oping an increasingly accurate picture
of the universe as it really is (see
Goodman, 1995). Pragmatists, it is
commonly believed, are not concerned
with the nature of reality, but with suc-
cessful working. For a pragmatist, a
statement or theory gains truth value if
This paper is dedicated to Yvonne. I missed
you all those years, my love.
An earlier version of the current work was
presented at a Guest Speaker's Seminar in the
Department of Psychology, University of Ne-
vada, Reno. I thank Linda Hayes, Steve Hayes,
Kelly Wilson, Yvonne Barnes-Holmes, Bryan
Roche, and two anonymous reviewers for their
many useful and constructive comments on ear-
lier versions of the current work.
Requests for reprints may be addressed to
Dermot Barnes-Holmes, Department of Psy-
chology, National University of Ireland, May-
nooth, Maynooth, County Kildare, Ireland (E-
mail: Dermot.Barnes-Holmes @may.ie).
it helps an individual achieve some
practical goal; whether or not the state-
ment or theory reflects an ontological
reality is seen to be irrelevant from the
pragmatist's perspective (Barnes &
Roche, 1997). In contrast to this view
of pragmatism, L. J. Hayes' (1993) has
argued that upon close scrutiny prag-
matists are in fact very concerned with
the nature of reality. The current article
begins with a detailed summary of her
argument. Subsequently, Quine's con-
cept of the observation sentence is ex-
amined. This "mainstream" pragmatist
concept is then used to evaluate the ac-
curacy of Hayes's claim that pragma-
tists are concerned with the nature of
reality, and as a result the accuracy of
the claim is found to be somewhat am-
biguous. Quine's concept of the obser-
vation sentence, however, also appears
to raise a problem. In the second half
I In the current article I will be citing both L.
J. Hayes and S. C. Hayes, but the former will
be cited far more frequently than the latter, and
thus inserting the initials L. J. for every appro-
priate citation would be rather unwieldy. Con-
sequently, I will simply cite Hayes in the former




of the article, therefore, a behavior-an-
alytic version of pragmatism is offered
that aims to address both the claim
made by Hayes (vis-a-vis pragmatism's
concern with reality) and the problem




One- and Two-Universe Systems
According to Hayes (1993), all hu-
man enterprises may be divided into
just two categories: one-universe and
two-universe systems. Hayes argues
that one-universe systems resist de-
scription, and that they underlie the
mystic traditions. In other words, one-
universe systems may be hinted at or
implied (e.g., through Buddhist koans),
but they cannot be spoken about di-
rectly. One cannot speak about another
universe, in a one-universe system, be-
cause in doing so one creates a two-
universe system (i.e., the universe of
speaking and the universe about which
one speaks).
Beyond the oneness, about which
one cannot speak, there are ways of
talking about the universe; what Hayes
calls conventional two-universe philos-
ophies. Under the rubric of conven-
tional philosophy, Hayes lists the ide-
alisms, including subjective idealism
and solipsism, in which the existence
of the knower is not questioned, and
thus the knower constitutes reality in
these positions. Hayes also lists more
elaborated or extended forms of ideal-
ism, in which the existence of the
knower is denied. Instead the knower
is considered to be an aspect of some
sort of deity. If the deity can be spoken
about this constitutes a two-universe
system, but if the deity cannot be de-
scribed, such a position may be cate-
gorized as a one-universe system.
Hayes also lists the realisms as ex-
amples of conventional philosophy,
which she subdivides into naive and
not-so-naive realism. For the former,
the universe exists independently of
the knower and can be known, more or
less, as it actually is. This is the com-
monsense view of the world, and
Hayes points out that few technical
philosophers subscribe to this view.
The latter, not-so-naive realism, consti-
tutes the position to which most tech-
nical philosophers of this genre sub-
scribe. According to this position, the
universe exists independently of the
knower, but it cannot be known as
such. According to Hayes, the know-
er's involvement serves to differentiate
the many positions falling into this cat-
egory. In some cases the knower gains
knowledge from sources other than ex-
perience or learning (e.g., innate or ex-
tranatural sources; Kant). Objective
idealism is similar in certain respects
(Plato and Hegel). What unifies these
positions, according to Hayes, "is the
contradictory proposition that we can-
not know the world as it actually is be-
cause our knowledge of the world as it
actually is does not correspond to what
we know about it" (1993, p. 37).
Hayes also points out that other re-
alists accept that knowledge of the
world is gained via contact with the
world, and because such contact differs
across knowers, and because no one
has contacted the universe in its entire-
ty, the known world has the stamp of
each knower's particular experience
and thus differs from the world as it
actually exists. From this point of
view, knowing is the issue, not exis-
tence, and epistemology is the focus,
not ontology.
According to Hayes, if this type of
not-so-naive realist assumed that
knowing was not about anything-that
speaking was not referential-this po-
sition might be considered an example
of a one-universe system, and as such
ontological concerns would be irrele-
vant. Hayes argues, however, that for
most realists "knowing is something
knowers do with respect to things other
than themselves" (1993, p. 37). Con-
sequently, despite the reluctance of the
not-so-naive realist to deal with onto-
logical issues, the ontological reality of
the universe is implicated whenever
epistemological issues with respect to
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it are addressed in this way. In effect,
Hayes believes that even for the not-
so-naive realist, what he or she says
about the universe is judged to be true
to the extent that it corresponds to the
universe as it actually is. At this point,
Hayes fleshes out her thesis by focus-
ing on the issue of truth.
Truth
Hayes deals first with correspon-
dence-based truth. She argues that
there are several problems with corre-
spondence as a truth criterion when in-
terpreted from a two-universe perspec-
tive. Specifically, Hayes considers
three possible types of correspondence,
and points out fundamental problems
with each type.
1. Correspondence between ontolog-
ical reality and description. Hayes be-
gins by pointing out that if correspon-
dence, as a truth criterion, implies for-
mal similarity between the words spo-
ken and the thing spoken about, this
requirement cannot be fulfilled. The
word horse, for example, bears no for-
mal resemblance to an actual horse. In
effect, if the universe is conceptualized
as something about which we speak
and not the speaking itself, correspon-
dence, interpreted as formal similarity,
eludes us.
2. Correspondence between ontolog-
ical reality and observation. In ad-
dressing this type of correspondence,
Hayes points out that to observe the
universe as it actually is would require
that we contact the universe in such a
way that our anthropological, biologi-
cal, cultural, and personal histories do
not contribute in any way to what we
know about the universe by way of that
contact. If these histories participate in
any act of observation they will influ-
ence how the universe is observed, and
thus direct or uncontaminated contact
with the universe becomes impossible
(e.g., which animal observes the world
as it actually is-a human, a bat, or a
fly?). To observe the universe as it ac-
tually is would require that observing
be considered a power, not an act. "A
power exerted by an entity that is itself
changeless-incorruptible" (Hayes,
1993, p. 39). As Hayes rightly points
out, this is not a doctrine that sits easily
with modem science. "There are no
such entities from a scientific perspec-
tive; and from a psychological per-
spective, there is no knowledge in
which knowers do not participate and
which is not colored by that participa-
tion" (Hayes, 1993, p. 39).
3. Correspondence between obser-
vation and description. In considering
this third type of correspondence,
Hayes points out that what a person
observes is not known until some form
of report is provided, and that report
is a description. In effect, an event oc-
curs (e.g., a red light), which is ob-
served (i.e., an individual notices the
red light), and a report or description
of that observation is then made (e.g.,
the person states "I saw a red light").
Only when the report occurs can we
know what the person observed. From
this perspective, it is impossible to
compare an observation with a descrip-
tion of an observation because in order
to do so, one must first convert the ob-
servation into a description, with the
result that one is no longer comparing
a description with an observation, but
a description with another description.
Hayes therefore concludes "that the
only things that can correspond as a
means of determining truth are what
we say about the universe and what we
say about the universe. What we say
now is true if it corresponds to what
we have said, or conversely, what we
have said continues to be true if it cor-
responds to what we say now" (Hayes,
1993, pp. 39-40). Clearly, convention-
al philosophy, as Hayes points out,
would not be satisfied with this partic-
ular view of truth.
Hayes acknowledges that some re-
alists are clearly aware of the problems
surrounding the correspondence truth
criterion (i.e., those problems arising
from the three types outlined above),
and have therefore adopted a pragmatic
truth criterion in which the truth of a
proposition is based on its usefulness.
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In short, pragmatists deny any connec-
tion between correspondence and truth.
Hayes, however, takes issue with this
denial.
Pragmatism and correspondence-
based truth. Hayes correctly points out
that pragmatists take the view that the-
oretical statements are deemed true or
false based on demonstrable effects in
the domain of practical affairs. Utility
at the level of practical affairs is re-
quired, Hayes argues, because it is only
at this level that the truth criterion may
be applied unambiguously. Hayes asks,
for example, "how do we know ...
when we have achieved the goal of
greater understanding? What does
greater understanding look like?"
(1993, p. 41). In contrast to the nebu-
lous nature of "greater understand-
ing," Hayes points out that we know
when our beliefs have served a more
mundane purpose by observing a spe-
cific outcome directly. For instance, we
know that a spot remover has removed
a spot when we see the spot removed.
Only in the domain of practical affairs,
Hayes suggests, may the usefulness of
a proposition be evaluated, because
only in this domain may we compare
the correspondence between what we
believe and what actually exists. At
this point Hayes concludes that utility-
based truth also depends on a corre-
spondence between what we say about
some feature of the universe and that
feature itself. For example, the state-
ment that "spot remover removes
spots" is useful (i.e., true) because the
statement is confirmed when we ob-
serve the actual removal of spots by
spot remover.
For Hayes, therefore, pragmatism
surrenders ultimately to correspon-
dence-based truth, and thus the philo-
sophical problems that Hayes suggests
arise out of this truth criterion also
emerge out of pragmatism. Further-
more, insofar as Hayes is correct, there
is an inherent verbal inconsistency in
the pragmatist's appeal to both utility
and correspondence as truth criteria.
QUINE ON
OBSERVATION SENTENCES
Is Hayes correct in asserting that
pragmatism relies ultimately on corre-
spondence as a truth criterion? In ad-
dressing this question, some of the
writings of the pragmatist philosopher
W. V. Quine (e.g., 1960, 1974, 1990)
seem most pertinent. There are, of
course, many other pragmatist philos-
ophers (see Goodman, 1995), but
Quine is generally considered to be
mainstream. Furthermore, and perhaps
more important, Quine's concept of the
observation sentence is concerned with
the truth value of statements made
about publicly observable events, and
thus this concept bears directly upon
Hayes's claim that the truth of a state-
ment, even for the pragmatist, is con-
firmed by the observation of actual
events.
According to Quine, an observation
sentence is deemed to be true when
most members of a language commu-
nity could, in principle, compare the
sentence to a particular event and agree
that it was correctly used in the pres-
ence of that event. In Quine's own
words, "A sentence is observational
insofar as its truth value, on any oc-
casion, would be agreed to by just
about any member of the speech com-
munity witnessing the occasion"
(1974, p. 39). For example, the obser-
vation sentence, "Spot remover re-
moved the spot," is true in English, if
the present situation contains the stim-
uli that were present when normal
speakers of English learned this ex-
pression. Quine considers observation
sentences to be critical for the acqui-
sition of language because their appro-
priate use can be easily checked with
the practices of the verbal community.
Furthermore, Quine argues that the se-
mantical nature of the observation sen-
tence means that it can be used by sci-
entists to resolve theoretical disagree-
ments. Again, in Quine's own words,
Observation sentences are sentences on which
scientists can reach agreement when they are
trying to reconcile their theories, and they are
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sentences that can be socially checked against
their occasions of utterance when we are picking
up a language. Because of this semantical trait
of observation sentences it is they that are
learned most readily, affording the entering
wedge in the acquisition of one's language. Ob-
servation sentences are the gateway to language,
as to science. (1974, p. 40)
Because Quine suggests that scien-
tists may resolve their theoretical dis-
agreements by appealing to observa-
tion sentences, one might easily con-
clude that Hayes's claim is in fact cor-
rect (i.e., that utility-based truth
depends ultimately on a correspon-
dence between what the pragmatist
says about some feature of the universe
and that feature itself). To draw this
conclusion, however, would be to mis-
understand Quine's concept of the ob-
servation sentence. Quine deliberately
combined the separate concepts of ob-
servation and description into the sin-
gle concept of the observation sentence
so that the issue of correspondence be-
tween observation and description (i.e.,
Hayes's third type of correspondence)
could be circumvented:
I propose that we drop the talk of observation
and talk instead of observation sentences, the
sentences that are said to report observations.
... No matter that sensations are private, and no
matter that men may take radically different
views of the environing situation; the observa-
tion sentence serves nicely to pick out what wit-
nesses can agree on. (Quine, 1974, p. 39)
For Quine, therefore, there is no sepa-
ration, conceptually, between the ob-
servation (i.e., the private sensation or
the different views of an event) and the
descriptive sentence; these two ele-
ments participate in a single conceptual
unit, and thus questions pertaining to
the correspondence between the obser-
vation and the sentence are rendered
meaningless.2 Accordingly, when sci-
entists employ observation sentences
as a means of resolving theoretical dis-
agreements, the issue of correspon-
2 As an aside, Quine's concept of the obser-
vation sentence bears some similarity to Skin-
ner's (1957) concept of the tact, insofar as both
concepts combine the talk and the talked about
into a single analytic unit.
dence simply does not arise. From this
perspective, therefore, Hayes is incor-
rect to argue that a utility-based truth
relies ultimately on correspondence be-
tween description of the feature and the
feature itself (or the observation of the
feature). However, the issue is not so
clear cut. In his treatment of observa-
tion sentences, Quine openly admits
that "homology" (an issue that arises
when one assumes correspondence be-
tween observation sentences and on-
tological reality) creates a problem for
his analysis, and it is to this issue that
we now turn.
As outlined earlier, an observation
sentence is deemed true when, on any
occasion, it would be agreed to by al-
most any member of the language
community witnessing the occasion.
As Quine points out, this definition of
the observation sentence relies on what
he refers to as "joint witnessing"
(1974, p. 41). In attempting to pin
down exactly what this term means, he
suggests that a more precise definition
would "speak of witnesses subject to
receptually similar impingements"
(1974, p. 41). In doing so, however,
Quine admits that this definition raises
the problem of homology. This prob-
lem refers to the fact that the physical
receptors of different organisms are far
from homologous, and thus one cannot
argue that agreement between two in-
dividuals occurs only when their re-
spective receptors are similarly affect-
ed by the event about which they
agree. Quine summarizes the problem
as follows:
Receptual similarity was defined ... in terms of
how close the class of all the receptors that were
activated in one episode came to matching the
class of those activated in another episode. At
that point we were thinking of the episodes and
the receptors as all belonging to one subject. But
now we have appealed to receptual similarity be-
tween episodes a and a' of two subjects. The
subjects share no receptors, so it is no longer a
question of matching the two classes of recep-
tors on the score of their sharing most of their
members. It becomes a question rather of how
nearly homologous, anatomically, most of the
members of one class are with those of the other.
Vagueness mounts, since the receptors of differ-
ent subjects are far from homologous. Nor is
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anything to be gained by trying rather to match
the distribution of the external forces impinging
on the two subjects; for we would have to re-
quire that the subjects be oriented alike to the
impingement pattern, and this revives the ho-
mology question. (1974, pp. 23-24)
Although Quine clearly acknowledges
that homology presents a problem for
his concept of joint witnessing, and
thus for his concept of the observation
sentence, he also argues that the prob-
lem may be approached pragmatically.
Continuing directly from the previous
quotation, Quine states, "In practice,
[italics added] of course, psychologists
find no difficulty in such intersubjec-
tive equating of stimulus situations;
they simply see that there are no phys-
ical differences that are apt to matter
[italics added]. We shall do well to take
the same line" (1974, p. 24). By fo-
cusing on actual practice, and what
matters (presumably to the psycholo-
gists in question), Quine is clearly ad-
vocating that the problem of homology
be ignored on pragmatic grounds.
Summary and Synthesis
To summarize, Quine apparently
avoids the problems surrounding cor-
respondence by combining the con-
cepts of observation and description
into the single conceptual unit of the
observation sentence. However, the def-
inition of the observation sentence re-
lies on the concept of joint witnessing,
and thus the issue of correspondence
(between observation sentence and on-
tological reality) reenters the picture
when Quine attempts to specify exactly
what joint witnesses are agreeing
about. Quine admits that they cannot
be agreeing about receptually similar
impingements, because the receptors of
different individuals are far from ho-
mologous. Consequently, Quine cannot
specify in precise terms exactly what
joint witnesses are agreeing about (be-
cause they do not necessarily possess
similar receptors). For Quine, there-
fore, the relation between the agree-
ment and the event agreed about re-
mains vague. At this point, it seems
that Hayes's criticism of the third type
of correspondence (i.e., between obser-
vation and description) also applies to
Quine's concept of the observation
sentence. Because we cannot identify
precisely what is being agreed about
when observation sentences are uttered
appropriately, we are left only with
agreement among such sentences and
no clear comparison of observation
sentences with ontological reality.
Truth therefore collapses into little
more than correspondence between
what we say about the universe and
what we say about the universe
(Hayes, 1993, pp. 39-40). In Quine's
defense, however, he openly accepts
the lacuna created by the problem of
homology and offers a pragmatic so-
lution by suggesting that philosophers,
like psychologists, need not concern
themselves with homology because in
practice it does not seem to matter.
Quine's appeal to pragmatism, as a
means of circumventing the problem of
homology, thus appears to undermine
Hayes's criticism that a utility-based
truth relies ultimately on correspon-
dence. Nevertheless, the problem of
homology raised by the concept of
joint witnessing still remains unre-
solved within the framework of
Quine's analysis. In other words, Quine
suggests that the problem may be ig-
nored on pragmatic grounds, but he
does not offer a pragmatic solution that
avoids the problem altogether.
At this point, therefore, it is difficult
to decide whether Hayes is in fact cor-
rect in claiming that pragmatists rely
ultimately on a correspondence-based
truth criterion. Hayes is correct insofar
as Quine's concept of joint witnessing
raises the problem of homology (and
with it the issue of correspondence),
but her claim is weakened when Quine
chooses to ignore this problem on
pragmatic grounds (note that her claim
is weakened only because Quine does
not avoid the problem). In any case,
this lack of clarity has led me to be-
lieve that there may be some value in
presenting a behavior-analytic version
of pragmatism that aims to avoid the
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problems raised by both Hayes and
Quine.
BEHAVIORAL PRAGMATISM
In what follows, I will outline a ver-
sion of pragmatism that not only
avoids the problem of homology but
also avoids Hayes's criticism that util-
ity-based truth relies ultimately on cor-
respondence. The form of pragmatism
to which I refer was laid out in an ear-
lier article that I coauthored with Bry-
an Roche (Barnes & Roche, 1997). In
this article, we outlined a solution to
the problem of what we called behav-
ioral reflexivity. This solution was both
pragmatic and behavior analytic, and
constituted what I now call behavioral
pragmatism. I will now outline this
version of pragmatism and explain
how it circumvents both the use of a
correspondence-based truth criterion
and the problem of homology.
The Three Basic Assumptions of
Behavioral Pragmatism
What I call behavioral pragmatism
may be broken down into three fun-
damental assumptions. These assump-
tions emerge directly out of the epis-
temology of behavior analysis (see
Barnes & Roche, 1994), and seem to
be completely consistent with the phi-
losophy of radical behaviorism (cf.
Chiesa, 1994). I have not labeled what
I am about to offer as radical behav-
iorism, however, because I am sure that
at least some individuals will disagree
with part or all of the following and
yet consider themselves to be radical
behaviorists.
Assumption 1: What is known is al-
ways a behavioralfunction. For the be-
havioral pragmatist, all events are de-
fined or known as behavioral func-
tions, instead of physical things that
exist independently of behavior (see
Skinner, 1938, on the inseparability of
stimuli and responses; see also Barnes
& Roche, 1994). Consider the simple
case of an apple. In commonsense
terms, the apple is a physical thing that
exists independently of behavior. For
the behavioral pragmatist, however, the
apple is defined only in terms of its
behavioral functions that emerge in a
particular stream of behavioral inter-
actions (see Barnes, 1989, pp. 340-
341; Schoenfeld & Farmer, 1970). The
apple, for example, may be defined as
an eliciting stimulus for a particular re-
sponse, such as salivation, or it may be
defined as a discriminative stimulus for
uttering "There's an apple," or it may
defined as a reinforcing stimulus for
other responses, such as pointing at the
apple or uttering "Give me the apple."
For the behavioral pragmatist, there-
fore, the apple (or any other part of the
universe) is always defined or known
within a particular behavioral stream
(see Barnes & Roche, 1994).
Assumption 2: The activity of each
organism participates in a separate be-
havioral stream. Behavioral pragma-
tism does not permit one organism's
behavioral stream to overlap perfectly
with a second organism's behavioral
stream. Consider, for example, the
sound of a fire alarm in a department
store. The behavioral pragmatist might
define the alarm as a discriminative
stimulus for a shopper who starts to
exit the store immediately after the
alarm is switched on. This discrimina-
tive function would be explained in
terms of the history of behavioral in-
teractions that established the function.
This history of behavioral interactions,
and the functional relation thus ob-
tained between the alarm and the "ex-
iting" response, constitutes part of the
shopper's behavioral stream. Consider
now a second shopper who also starts
to leave the store at the sound of the
alarm. In commonsense terms, we
would likely say that the alarm is the
same alarm for both shoppers. The be-
havioral pragmatist, however, must de-
fine two separate discriminative func-
tions for the two exiting responses.
Separate functions are defined for two
main reasons. First, the history of be-
havioral interactions that established
the discriminative function of the
alarm for the exiting response of one
of the shoppers cannot be identical to
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the history that established the function
for the response of the other shopper
(e.g., one shopper may have previous
experience of the fire alarm in that
store, whereas the other may not). In-
sofar as a discriminative function is ex-
plained, in part, by the history of be-
havioral interactions that produced that
function, then clearly the functions for
the two shoppers cannot be considered
identical. Second, the discriminative
function of the alarm may be manipu-
lated independently in one or another
of the behavioral streams. Imagine, for
example, that a security guard says to
one of the shoppers, "Ignore the alarm,
there's a fault in the system." In this
case, the discriminative function of the
alarm may suddenly change in one be-
havioral stream but not in the other
(e.g., one shopper will remain in the
store while the other continues to hurry
for the exit). As such, there are two fire
alarms, one in each behavioral stream.
In summary, therefore, Assumption 2
of behavioral pragmatism views the ac-
tivity of each organism as participating
in separate behavioral streams. Even
when two organisms are responding to
the "same" event (in commonsense
terms), they do so from within their re-
spective streams (see also Roche &
Barnes, 1997).
Assumption 3: The activity of the be-
havioral pragmatist participates in a
behavioral stream. According to be-
havioral pragmatism, even the activity
of a behavioral pragmatist participates
in a behavioral stream, and thus no
special point of vantage is available to
the pragmatist from which to conduct
scientific analyses (Skinner, 1974, p.
234). Such analyses, therefore, do not
involve discovering the fundamental
laws of nature or developing an in-
creasingly accurate picture of an on-
tological reality; instead, scientific ac-
tivity itself is subject to scientific anal-
ysis (Skinner, 1969, p. 141). From this
perspective, the output pattern from a
cumulative record, for example, is not
a representation of what the rat or pi-
geon "really" did in the operant cham-
ber. Instead, the pattern may be defined
as a discriminative stimulus for a par-
ticular "scientific" response, such as
"scallop" or "break-and-run," that has
been differentially reinforced in the
presence of that pattern. In short, the
activity of a particular behavioral prag-
matist is always part of that pragma-
tist's behavioral stream.
Truth and Behavioral Pragmatism
Assumptions 1 and 2 of behavioral
pragmatism do not directly affect the
issue of truth. Assumption 3, however,
appears to preclude the possibility, in
behavioral pragmatism, of finding a
scientific truth statement that corre-
sponds to an ontological reality. In ef-
fect, if the scientific activity of the be-
havioral pragmatist is the product of a
behavioral history, then he or she can
never claim to have found an ontolog-
ical truth, because a different or more
extended history may have produced a
different truth (an ontological truth, by
definition, is immutable, absolute, and
final). This is not a problem for the be-
havioral pragmatist, however, because
truth is defined simply in terms of pre-
diction and control (i.e., successful
working). If a scientific statement is
useful in helping the behavioral prag-
matist to achieve the goals of predic-
tion and control with some degree of
scope and precision, then the statement
is considered true (see Barnes &
Roche, 1994; S. C. Hayes & Brown-
stein, 1986; Skinner, 1974, p. 235).
The correspondence between the sci-
entific statement and an ontological re-
ality is entirely irrelevant.
In adopting the goals of prediction
and control, a behavioral pragmatist
may often talk as if "real" events are
being contacted outside of the behav-
ioral stream. According to the behav-
ioral pragmatist, however, such onto-
logical talk is considered to be a par-
ticular instance of scientific verbal be-
havior. Imagine, for the sake of
argument, that in the course of an ex-
perimental analysis a behavioral prag-
matist discovers that whenever he or
she arranges for event X to occur,
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event Y always follows. If the prag-
matist then states that, "X produces
goal Y," one may be tempted to as-
sume correspondence between the goal
statement and the X-then-Y event. Ac-
cording to behavioral pragmatism,
however, the goal statement and the
event participate in a behavioral
stream, and thus no correspondence
between the statement and a nonbehav-
ioral, ontological reality need be as-
sumed. For illustrative purposes con-
sider a more technical description. An
individual may learn to respond to the
statement "X produces goal Y" and
the observation that X always precedes
Y as being equivalent or coordinated
(see S. C. Hayes & Barnes-Holmes, in
press). These relations may also be co-
ordinated with other relations that may
become functionally related within the
individual's behavioral stream. These
functionally equivalent relations do not
correspond to or refer to one another,
they are simply coordinated within a
set of contingencies operating on the
individual's behavior. The issue of cor-
respondence, therefore, is simply irrel-
evant.3
For the behavioral pragmatist all sci-
entific talk participates in a single be-
havioral stream containing (a) the
pragmatist's verbally stated goals, (b)
the pragmatist's analytic talk about
how to achieve them, and (c) the prag-
matist's statement as to whether or not
they have been achieved. Such talk is
a-ontological in the sense that it is ver-
3The idea that a behavioral pragmatist is un-
able to say anything that corresponds to an on-
tological reality may be seen by some as an un-
bearable conceptual or even psychological bur-
den. In other words, if even scientific statements
are behavioral events, and as such are not on-
tologically true, what is the point in doing sci-
ence? Interestingly, Skinner did not appear to be
overly concerned with this issue when he wrote,
"If human behavior is as fully determined as the
behaviorist says it is, why does he bother to
write a book? Does he believe that anything
matters? ... Similar questions might as well be
asked of the author of a book on respiration: 'If
that is respiration, why do you go on breath-
ing?' " (1974, pp. 247-248). Or, more appro-
priately in the current context, "If that is truth,
why do you go on searching for it?"
bal behavior (i.e., it involves the dy-
namic and codefining interaction
among stimulus and response func-
tions). Verbal behavior, technically de-
fined, does not refer or correspond to
an external reality. From this behavior-
al perspective, what matters is not cor-
respondence between what the prag-
matist says and some aspect of reality,
but whether the pragmatist concludes
(i.e., states verbally) that a particular
analysis (i.e., previous verbal behavior)
led to achieving his or her particular
goal (which was also verbally stated).
Although behavioral pragmatism may
appear somewhat "autistic" in its em-
phasis on the personal goals of a single
pragmatist, such philosophical autism
is avoided if the pragmatist adopts the
goal of "getting other individuals to
communicate and agree." This agree-
ment also is always discriminated
within a single behavioral stream.
By focusing on the personal goals of
the behavioral pragmatist, truth always
remains a behavioral issue (i.e., stating
a particular goal and trying to achieve
it are behavioral events). Furthermore,
the personal or behavioral nature of
scientific goals is emphasized in be-
havioral pragmatism because doing so
guards against dogmatic or ontological
statements concerning the goals them-
selves (S. C. Hayes, 1993). If a partic-
ular goal is clearly discriminated as
participating in the behavioral stream
of a behavioral pragmatist, he or she
has no grounds on which to argue that
the goal is the best or right goal in
some absolute or final sense (i.e., if the
goal is behavioral, then it may well
change if the contingencies change; see
Leigland, 1993). The only way in
which goals may be justified, within
behavioral pragmatism, is to point to
other goals. A behavioral pragmatist
might say, for example, that achieving
prediction and control will be of ben-
efit to the wider culture, in areas such
as education and health (i.e., achieving
prediction and control is justified by
pointing to the additional goal of help-
ing the wider culture). If asked to jus-
tify this latter goal, then another goal
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may be identified, such as feeling good
by helping the wider culture (i.e., help-
ing others is justified by pointing to the
goal of feeling good). Obviously, if a
behavioral pragmatist argued that he or
she had identified the best or right
goal, this would clearly undermine the
third assumption of behavioral prag-
matism: One cannot escape the behav-
ioral stream and contact a nonbehav-
ioral event, such as an ontologically
correct goal. For the behavioral prag-
matist, scientific goals are like any oth-
er instance of verbal behavior-they
are uttered and are subsequently
strengthened, maintained, or weakened
by the contingencies of reinforcement.
Behavioral Pragmatism: Conclusion
Behavioral pragmatism is an unusu-
al and perhaps threatening philosophi-
cal position. As a philosophy, it leaves
each of us hanging naked in the wind
with nothing but our own personal
goals for protection against the cold
wind of professional and academic life
(S. C. Hayes, 1993). This is not a po-
sition that most scientists or philoso-
phers enjoy. The histories of such in-
dividuals often push them towards sci-
ence and philosophy because they want
definite and final answers to the mys-
teries of the universe. Furthermore, the
wider community often confers upon
the scientist expert shaman- or priest-
like qualities. Naturally, few of us want
to sacrifice this luxury at the altar of
verbal or philosophical consistency.
We appear to have a choice, therefore,
between living with the discomfort cre-
ated by there being no absolute or ul-
timate point to science, beyond that
provided by our own goal statements,
or living with the philosophical prob-
lems or verbal inconsistencies created
by the assumption that scientific talk
corresponds (at least potentially) to an
external reality. I have chosen to live
with the discomfort of a pointless,
goal-based science, and I call this so-
lution to the problem of reality and
truth behavioral pragmatism.4
Behavioral Pragmatism: Implications
for Hayes and Quine
I will now return to the issues raised
by Hayes and Quine, and consider the
implications of behavioral pragmatism
for their respective positions.
Hayes. The foregoing description of
behavioral pragmatism allows one to
appreciate how easily behavioral prag-
matism fits into what Hayes describes
as a one-universe system. Although I
previously used the phrase behavioral
stream, I could easily have used the
phrase behavioral universe. From this
perspective, the activity of the behav-
ioral pragmatist constitutes a single
universe in which all events are con-
tained; there is no separation ontolog-
ically between the pragmatist's talk and
the talked about. From this perspective,
a behavioral pragmatist engages in
"spot-removing language" because it
has proven useful in achieving specific
goals in the past, not because it con-
stitutes an appeal to ontology. Thus,
when a behavioral pragmatist exhorts,
"Look at the data, it's there in black
and white," this is a response that in
the past has produced reinforcing con-
sequences. Whether the data actually
reflect some form of ontological reality
is irrelevant. Consequently, Hayes's
claim that pragmatists rely ultimately
on a correspondence-based truth crite-
4 The reader may note some similarity be-
tween behavioral pragmatism and the philosoph-
ical pragmatism of Richard Rorty (e.g., 1989).
In both cases, language is considered to be a tool
or behavioral repertoire for achieving certain
goals, and as such does not constitute a repre-
sentational system for capturing the "true" na-
ture of "reality." Despite this clear point of con-
tact between Rorty's philosophy and behavioral
pragmatism, the two are quite different. As in-
dicated earlier, for example, the latter is strongly
rooted in the epistemology of behavior analysis
and the philosophy of radical behaviorism, nei-
ther of which, as far as I am aware, has influ-
enced Rorty's work. In any case, a detailed treat-
ment of the relationship between these two
forms of pragmatism is beyond the scope of the
current article.
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rion does not apply to behavioral prag-
matism.
Quine. Quine's concept of the ob-
servation sentence is quite acceptable
from the behavioral pragmatist's per-
spective, because the concept neatly
removes the problem of correspon-
dence by unifying observation and de-
scription into a single conceptual unit
(not unlike Skinner's, 1957, concept of
the tact). Quine departs from behavior-
al pragmatism, however, in suggesting
that one might look to agreement
among observation sentences as the
basis for truth, rather than to the per-
sonal goals of the individual making
the observation sentence. For the be-
havioral pragmatist, Quine's observa-
tion sentence is a useful tool that sci-
entists and others often use to achieve
certain goals. One of these goals may
be to achieve agreement among the
members of a particular community
(perhaps because such agreement may
help to achieve yet other more long-
term goals). For the behavioral prag-
matist, therefore, Quine's concern with
agreement, and the resultant problem
of what is actually being agreed about,
are irrelevant and thus the problem of
homology is completely avoided. On
balance, I should stress that a behav-
ioral pragmatist may well be interested
in how stimuli impinge upon the re-
ceptors of an organism (apparently
raising the issue of homology). How-
ever, the relevant analyses would have
to be couched in the language of func-
tion, not structure; the pragmatist
would not look for key structural sim-
ilarities within or across the receptors
of individual organisms to account for
agreement about stimulating events.
Instead, he or she would focus on the
structure of receptual activity only in
terms of its functional relations to other
stimulating and perhaps response
events. For example, different patterns
of receptor activity in a particular or-
ganism (e.g., excitation of rods and
cones) may be grouped into one re-
sponse class, because they are found to
be functionally related to a particular
stimulating event (e.g., the presentation
of a red light). Similarly, that same
class of patterns of receptor activity
may be considered as the first part of
a behavior-behavior relation, if the
class was found to be functionally re-
lated to a particular class of verbal re-
ports (e.g., "I saw red"). In summary,
the question of homology, raised by
Quine, becomes a problem only if one
assumes that final explanations for be-
havioral events will be found in the
structural patterns of receptor activity
per se. If the activity of such receptors
is incorporated into the functional anal-
ysis of behavior, the problem of ho-
mology disappears. In other words, the
question of homology is completely
avoided within the philosophical
framework of behavioral pragmatism.
SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSION
The current article began by exam-
ining Hayes's claim that pragmatism
relies ultimately on a correspondence-
based truth criterion. In order to eval-
uate her claim, Quine's concept of the
observation sentence was considered.
Although the concept appears to re-
move the problem of correspondence,
it reemerges in Quine's appeal to
agreement as the basis for truth. Quine
therefore suggests that we simply ig-
nore (but not avoid) the problem on
pragmatic grounds. Consequently, it
was argued that there may some sub-
stance to Hayes's claim that pragma-
tism relies ultimately on correspon-
dence as a truth criterion. Behavioral
pragmatism was then introduced as a
means of circumventing both Hayes's
claim and Quine's implicit appeal to
correspondence. Although successful
in achieving these aims, behavioral
pragmatism does rob science and phi-
losophy of any final or absolute objec-
tive beyond the pragmatist's own per-
sonal goals. Nevertheless, behavioral
pragmatism cannot be criticized for
generating the same philosophical
problems that have come to be asso-
ciated with correspondence-based
truth, nor can it be criticized for ap-
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pealing to both correspondence- and
utility-based truth. In defining truth be-
haviorally, the behavioral pragmatist
always appeals to utility, and never
correspondence, as a truth criterion.
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